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REFEREEING THE REFEREES: THE CONTINUING
PROCEDURAL MUDDLE IN CASES OF GENERAL
REFERENCE PURSUANT TO OHIO RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 53
by
RICHARD P. PERNA'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent avalanche of civil litigation' has heightened the modern court's
demand for a streamlined and more efficient method of administering the
judicial process.' The advent of the so-called "ministerial" judge,3 tight cen-
tralized calendar control,4 and the use of mediators' and arbitrators6 exemplify
specific responses to the broad systemic problem. Judicial reference provides
another "procedural"' device which sometimes is perceived as offering a solu-
tion to the problem of judicial delay.
Judicial reference is generally defined as the substitution of "non-judicial"
personnel in the place of judges to perform a designated and limited portion of
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A. 1971, Villanova University; J.D.
1975, Villanova University School of Law. The author wishes to thank David White for his invaluable
research assistance without which this article would not have been written.
'See, e.g.. Burger, Isn't Therea Better Way?68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion. 27
STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate, 50 TEX. L. REv. 1349 (1972): Fleming,
Court Survived in the Litigation Explosion. 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old
Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44S. CAL. L. REV. 901 (1971); Kline, Law Reform and the Courts:
More Power to the People or the Profession, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 14 (1978); Bok, Dealing with Overload inArti-
cle !11 Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976). As to the increase in the volume of civil litigation in Ohio, see generally
the data published yearly by the Ohio Supreme Court in Ohio Courts Summary. It is notable, however, that
the perception of a dramatic increase in civil litigation is not universally shared. See, e.g., Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 5 (1983).
'See, e.g., Burger, supra note 1, at 275; Burger, Today's Challenge: Improving the Administration of Justice,
55 N.Y. ST. B.J. 7 (1983).
'See, e.g., Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
'See, e.g., Individual Calendar Works in D.C. Court, 5 THIRD BRANCH 6, (May 1973); Five Districts Using
Individual Calendar, I THIRD BRANCH 1, (Sept. 1969); Planet, Smith, Olson, & Connolly, Screening and
Tracking Civil Cases: A New Approach to Managing Cases in the District of Columbia, 8 JUsT. Svs. J. 338
(1983).
'See, e.g., Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
'The reference device should be distinguished from arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. See gener-
ally 6 0. JUR. 3D Arbitration §§ I et. seq. (1978) for a discussion of arbitration as method of dispute resolu-
tion.
'Judicial reference is purely a procedural device and is not jurisdictional. Dillon v. Cleveland, 117 Ohio St.
258, 158 N.E. 606 (1927); Toulmin v. Becker, 94 Ohio App. 524, 115 N.E.2d 705 (1952). See also Hines v.
Amole, 4 Ohio App. 3d 263, 448 N.E.2d 473 (1982); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 106 Ohio App. 146, 146 N.E.2d
151 (1957).
'Turner, "Relief is Just a 'Civil Rule'A way. "47 OHIo ST. B. REP. 297 (1974).
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a trial court's adjudicatory function9 in a particular case or class of cases.'" For
example, instead of submitting contested issues of fact and/or law to a judge (or
jury), cases go to a referee appointed to determine both and to report a pro-
posed solution to the trial court.
The judicial reference device set out in Rule 53 of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure was touted in 1974 as a procedure capable of relieving the "problem
of justice delayed" by "easing the increasing judicial burden" on a besieged ju-
diciary." While judicial reference is certainly no panacea for the problem (if
numbers alone are a valid indicator), it is difficult to refute claims that the ref-
erence device contributes to a more efficient and speedy administration of jus-
tice.'2
Although the regular and widespread use of referees is a relatively recent
phenomenon, 3 judicial reference has enjoyed a long history in Ohio.'4 For well
over a hundred years, Ohio trial judges have had specific statutory authority to
refer certain cases to a appointed non-judicial "referees" for determination.'5
Historically, an Ohio judge could refer cases to a referee either upon the volun-
tary consent of the parties in the litigation or compulsorily in cases in which
there was no right to a jury trial. 6 In either circumstance, a judge retained the
'The reference device is meant to function as an aid to the trial court in exercising its adjudicatory function.
Thus, for example, the reference device does not contemplate the appointment of arbitrators. See Cuyahoga
County v. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 47 Ohio App. 2d 28, 351 N.E.2d 777 (1975). However, the referee is a
substitute for the trial judge in the exercise of certain judicial functions. Historically, a referee's hearing is
usually conducted in lieu of and not in addition to a trial on the merits. St. Clair Savings v. Jansan, 40 Ohio
App. 2d 211,318 N.E.2d 538 (1974).
'"For a general definition of "reference," see Lawson v. Bissel, 7 Ohio St. 129 (1857). The terminology can be
confusing. Judicial reference is a broad generic term which can refer to the use of masters, special masters,
referees and other non-judicial personnel for a variety of purposes. See generally 47 0. JUR. 2D References §
12 (1961). In this article, the term "judicial reference" refers to the Ohio practice of using referees to hear
evidence on disputed issues of fact and law and report their findings and recommendations to the trial court.
While a reference can be very limited in scope, this article deals primarily with the reference of an entire case
to a referee for hearing and report on all disputed issues. The practice of referring an entire case to a referee
will be called "general reference" as distinguished from a more restrictive "single-issue reference."
"Turner, supra note 8, at 297.
2For example, subsequent to the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Montgomery County hired
its first full-time common pleas court referee in 1975. In 1985, there were eight full-time common pleas court
referees. In addition, a substantial number of "part-time" referees are utilized. Without these referees, addi-
tional case pressures would fall on already overburdened judges. State-wide municipal court case statistics
also reflect the contribution made by municipal court referees. Since 1975, there have been over 200,000
cases per year terminated by hearings held before referees. OHIO MUNICIPAL COURTS ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGE REPORT, COMPOSITE FOR THE ENTIRE STATE.
"See supra note 12.
"For a complete and more detailed history of judicial reference in Ohio see 47 0. JUR. 2D References § 81
(1961).
'"Although reference was initially recognized in this country in early common law, see, e.g., Heckers v.
Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1865), reference in Ohio was originally legislatively created. The original statutory
grant is found in 51 Ohio Laws 57, § 283 enacted in 1853. More recently, reference was governed by §§
2315.26-2315.37 of the Ohio Revised Code, as amended effective December I, 1967. In addition, reference
was authorized in the probate court by § 2315.37 of the Ohio Revised Code, in municipal court by §
1901.13(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, and in juvenile court by § 2151.16 of the Ohio Revised Code.
"Consensual reference was governed by § 2315.26 of the Ohio Revised Code and was interpreted as being
incident to the court's power of judicial administration. Dillon v. Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 606
[Vol. 19:4
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discretion to refer the case in its entirety ["general reference"] or merely to
refer a portion of the case ["single issue reference"].'"
With the adoption of Rule 53 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in
197 1, judicial reference became a matter governed directly by the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure and was no longer a matter of statutory authority.'
Although the increased use of referees in Ohio seems to correspond to the
adoption of Rule 53,19 the authoritative change was essentially cosmetic. In
scope, Rule 53 was intended to cover matters formerly governed by sections
2315.26 through 2315.43 inclusive of the Ohio Revised Code, 2 and Rule 53 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2' For example, the rule retains the broad
scope of reference which had existed under the prior statutory practice 2 by
specifically preserving a trial judge's discretionary power to determine the
scope of the reference, that is, whether the reference will be "general" or
"single issue."23 Similarly, Rule 53 authorizes reference only by consent of the
parties except in those cases where neither party has a right to trial by jury.24
Thus, Rule 53 preserves the prior limitation on the kinds of cases potentially
subject to an order of reference, 2 a limitation consistent with the view that
(1927) : Rankin v. Hannan. 37 Ohio St. 113 (1881). Where consent was absent. compulsory reference was
provided for in § 2315.27 of the Ohio Revised ('ode. See generally. 47 0. JUR 2D References §§ 4-6 (196 11.
"§ 2315.26 of the Ohio Revised Code, which applied in cases of consensual reference, specifically allowed
reference of "any of the issues" in the action. § 2315.27 of the Ohio Revised ('ode authorized compulsory
reference in non-jury matters "in any case." In either situation. the referee could be appointed to hear the
facts and/or the law in a case. See Lawson v. Bissell, 7 Ohio St. 12911857. This article distinguishes between
cases in which all issues, i.e., the entire case. is referred, and those in which only a portion. i.e., less than the
entire case, is sent to a referee. The former will be referred to as "general reference" and the latter "single-
issue reference."
"The Ohio Civil Rules are accorded a position of superiority vis-a-vis state statutes that regulate procedure
by voiding procedural statutes in conflict with those rules. See OHIO CoNsr. art. IV, § 51B). Thus, with the
adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in 1974, Rule 53 superseded §§ 2315.26-2315.43 of the Ohio
Revised Code.
"See supra note 12.
"
0OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 271 (Page 1982) (Staff note).
-'The Ohio Civil Rule 53 is patterned after the Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of ('ivil Procedure. Id. The two
are similar but not identical. One major difference is the applicable trial court scope of review of the referee's
proposed factual findings. Ohio Civil Rule 53 authorizes a trial court to reject the referee's findings without
any deference. OHIo R. Civ. P. 53. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60. In marked contrast, Rule
53(E)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "in an action to be tried without a jury the
court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 531E(12). See Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'don other grounds. 409 U.S. 363 (1973)
2See supra note 17.
2 Rule 53(A) authorizes the appointment of a referee to "hear an issue or issues." OHIO R. 'iv. P. 53(A). In
addition, Subsection (A) of Rule 53 addresses the appointment of referees and the criteria that govern the
selection process. The only limitation in Rule 53 concerning appointment is that the person selected be an
"attorney at law admitted to practice in this state." Id. Historically. there was no limitation on the appoint-
ment of non-attorneys. § 2315.28 of the Ohio Revised Code authorized the selection of a referee by agree-
ment of the parties or, in the absence of such an agreement, at the court's discretion.
"Rule 53(A) specifically limits the appointment of referees to cases in "which the parties are not entitled to a
trial by jury" or to cases in "which the parties specifically consent in writing or in the record in open court."
Id.
"See supra note 16.
Spring, 19861
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reference is a procedural device originating in the court's equity jurisdiction.26
In theory, reference enhances judicial efficiency27 by altering the normal
adjudicatory process and substituting a designated non-judicial person to act in
place of the trial judge for certain limited purposes. When a court refers a case
to a referee to hear and report on all disputed issues of fact and law, the court
saves the time otherwise normally required to accomplish these judicial tasks. 8
Ultimately, increased judicial efficiency directly relates to the nature of the
reference, with "general reference" providing the greatest savings. The court
undoubtedly saves substantial time when it refers entire cases to referees to
hear and report on all disputed issues.29
Even in cases of general reference, however, the referee is not intended to
be a complete substitute for the trial court.3" Instead, the referee performs only
the limited portion of the judicial function specifically authorized in the trial
court's order of reference.' While the referee may be empowered to act as the
:"The early Ohio reference statutes date back to 1853. There is no legislative history existing with regard to
those early statutes. However, there is some suggestion that the initial Ohio reference statutes were based on
the inherent powers of courts of equity to refer cases. See Deville v. Deville 87 Ohio App. 220, 94 N.E.2d
474 11949). This position is consistent with former § 2315.27 of the Ohio Revised Code which had autho-
rized reference only in those cases where the parties were not permitted a jury trial as a matter of right lab-
sent consent). See 47 0. JUR. 2D References §§ 6, 12 (1961). In the federal system, reference is based on pro-
visions of the old equity rules. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 joined in one category court officers
whose functions had been divided before the merger of law and equity. See Cruz v. Havick, 515 F.2d 322
(5th Cir. 1976). cert denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Hall, 76 F.2d 258 18th Cir.
1935). cert denied. 296 U.S. 621 (1935): Finance Committee v. Wassen. 82 F. 525 17th Cir. 18971.
2 See injra note 28. In contrast, historical experience with the reference device at the Federal level suggests
otherwise. "It is a matter of common knowledge that reference greatly increases the cost of litigation and
delays and postpones the end of litigation. The delay in some instances is unbelievably long. Likewise, the in-
crease in cost is heavy." Adventures in Great Eating v. Best Place to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 814-15 (7th Cir.
1942). However, there have since been dramatic changes in federal court opinion. See Silberman. Masters
and Magistrates Part I1: The American Analogue. 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1297 11975); Gallagher, Comment:
An Expanding Role for United States Magistrates. 26 AM. U.L. Rtv. 66 J1976).
2 Historically, the reference device was viewed as a mechanism to relieve the court of its work. Burch v.
Harte, I Ohio N.P. 447, 484, (1903). The device was also a way of facilitating the administration of justice
particularly when cases could not be quickly adjudicated because of court delays. Strunk v. Moores, 12 Ohio
Dec. 436 (1901). One of the prime reasons for creating the reference device was the limited nature of equity
jurisdiction. Thus, the referee's inquiry may be broader and more effective than that of the equity court
where, for example, the case before the court presents detailed questions of bookkeeping. Meyer v. Lipski, 7
Ohio N.P. 366, 367 (1900); Robison v. Cleveland City R.R. Co., 5 Ohio N.P. 293, 297-98 (18981. Interesting-
ly, the increased current use of referees in Ohio seems inconsistent with the historical roots of the reference
device.
"'This conclusion is based on the realistic assumption that the trial court will take less time to "review" the
report and recommendations of the referee than it would if it were to entirely hear the matter itself (there is
no available empirical data relevant to this assumption). However, the amount of time saved by the trial
court is directly related to the nature of the trial court "review" and the amount of deference given to the
findings and recommendations of the referee. See infra text accompanying note 174. For example, if a de
novo hearing is held after a judicial reference, there would be an overall loss of efficiency since the case
would expend twice the number of "judicial" man-hours.
'For example, while Rule 53 grants to referees certain powers in common with a judge in the trial court, see
infra note 47 and accompanying text, Rule 53 does not give a referee the power to enter a binding judgment.
OHIo R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5). See infra text beginning at note 66.
' Rule 53 provides that the order of reference "may specify or limit" the powers of the referee and may direct
him to "report only upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report
evidence only." OHio R. Civ. P. 53. A court may also "fix the time and place" for hearings and for the filing
[Vol. 19:4
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court's hearing officer in place of the trial judge32, the jurisdictional power to
actually effect the rights and obligations at issue between the parties remains
in the court33 and cannot be judicially delegated to a non-judicial third person.34
Thus, referees can not actually decide cases in place of the judge - they may
only aid the court to exercise its judicial powers more efficiently. 5
The dichotomy existing between the requirements of judicial "decision-
making" and judicial efficiency creates the tension that is the primary focus of
this article. The trial court cannot delegate its judicial "decision-making"
power to a referee and yet judicial "decision-making" after the reference is a
time consuming process which limits the efficiency of the adjudicatory
scheme. 6 The dilemma is at once both obvious and problematic.
Can a court really retain its actual "decision-making" function when it
bases its decision on the written "report" of a third party? Can the referee
system really promote judicial economy if the trial court must "review" the
record made before the referee in order to make its own judicial determination?
How many of the functional aspects of a "decision-making" can a judge
delegate and still retain his or her "decision-making" power? To the outside
observer, the functional relationship between the judge and referee seems
uncertain at best.
On its face, Rule 53, as originally enacted, sets out a procedural
mechanism which attempts to reconcile these seemingly conflicting goals of
judicial reference. Subsection E of Rule 53 establishes a number of safeguards
designed to ensure that the final decision in any case of reference is made by
the judge and not the referee, while simultaneously enhancing overall judicial
efficiency. 7 Despite the existence of these safeguards, problems developed
shortly after the rule's enactment in 197 1 which raised serious doubt concern-
of the report. Id. The notion of "powers" contained in Rule 53 incorporates both the scope and function of
the reference. Thus, a court may limit the scope of the reference to those issues specifically enumerated by
the referring court. Id. Similarly. the function of the referee may be limited to "particular acts" enumerated
by the court including a limitation that the referee is to "receive and report evidence only." Id.
:d.
"The referee has no authority to enter binding judgments. See OHio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5). See also in/ra text
beginning at note 66. In addition, the Ohio Constitution squarely places judicial power in the judiciary. Any
attempt to delegate that power, therefore, would raise serious constitutional concerns. See infra text accom-
panying note 55. See also supra note 7.
-See inira note 49 and accompanying text.
"See infra note 5 I. See also Rule I(B) which requires that the rules be construed and applied to "effect just
results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administra-
tion of justice." OHIO R. Civ. P. I(B).
'See infra text beginning at note 174. This conclusion concerning efficiency is based on an assumption con-
cerning the total number of judicial man-hours expended in resolving the litigant's dispute. See supra note
29. However, if one were to look beyond the number of hours expended per case to the economic cost per
hour of time, a different conclusion might well be reached. Because a referee's salary is much less than that
of a judge, there could be an economic savings even when the use of the reference device results in an overall
increase of judicial man-hours. Presently there exists no empirical study in Ohio which addresses these par-
ticular economic issues.
"See infra text beginning at note 55.
Spring, 19861
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ing the extent to which the spirit and intent of the rule were actually followed
in practice.38 On December 24, 1984 and January 8, 1985, the Supreme Court
of Ohio submitted proposed amendments to Rule 53 before the Ohio General
Assembly These amendments were reviewed and, subsequently, were made
effective on July i, 1985 in an attempt to address and resolve many of the
problems which developed under Rule 53 as it stood originally enacted.
This article examines the problems that existed under Rule 53, as original-
ly enacted, as well as the proposed solutions embodied in the 1985 amend-
ments to the rule. The article initially examines the allocation of judicial
"decision-making" power between the trial judge and the referee in cases of
general reference. It then analyzes the effectiveness of the various procedural
safeguards contained in the rule and the amendments. Lastly, the article pro-
poses additional procedural safeguards that would better balance the inherent-
ly conflicting goals of a successful reference system.
11. THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER AND DECISIONMAKING
A. The Referee's Enumerated Powers - Ohio Civil Rule 53(C)
Historically, there has been little controversy in Ohio concerning a
Referee's authority in cases of reference. The "powers" of a referee have
always been derivative"0 and the same is true in cases referred pursuant to Rule
53 . ' As set out in Subsection (C) of Rule 53, a referee can act only as specifical-
ly authorized by the referring trial court which retains the discretion to limit
the reference as it deems necessary. 2 In this regard, the notion of a referee's
"powers" contained in Rule 53 incorporates a judicially controlled limitation
on both the scope of the reference and the function of the referee.4"
While the referring trial court may specify or limit the scope of the refer-
'.See infra text beginning at note 70.
' 15 Ohio Op. 3d A-I 111985).
"'Mennel Milling Co. v. Slosser. 140 Ohio St. 445. 446-50. 45 N.E.2d 306, 307-08 119421: Dillon v.
Cleveland. 117 Ohio St. 258. 265-71, 158 N.E. 606. 609-10} (1927): (fault v. (iauh, 20 Ohio App. 2d 57.
59-61. 251 N.E.2d 866. 868-69 11969l.
Oimo R. (iv. P. 53(C). A referee derives his power to act directly from the trial court by virtue of its order
of reference. A referee has no authority to act absent an order of reference. Eisenberg v. Peyton. 56 Ohio
App. 2d 144. 144-46, 381 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (1978): Berry v. Berry. 50 Ohio App. 2d 137. 139-41, 361
N.F.2d 1095. 1096-97 119771: Wolff v. Kreiger. 48 Ohio App. 2d 153, 155-56. 356 N.E.2d 316. 318-19
11976). However, a properly adopted local rule of court providing for an automatic reference in certain
classes of cases satisfies the requirement of Rule 53 that there must be an order of reference to authorize any
action on the part of a referee. White v White, 50 Ohio App. 2d 263. 266-68. 362 N.E.2d 1013. 1016-17
(19771.
1OtlO R. Civ. P. 531(0 Pursuant to this rule, the referring trial court in its order of reference "may specify or
limit" the powers of the referee "to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to
receive and report evidence only." Id. Further, the rule specifies that the referee has and shall exercise his
power "subject to the specifications and limitations" in the reference order. Id.
"Id. The scope of the reference refers to the substantive issues to be addressed by the referee. The function
of the referee can vary depending on the specific order of reference, i.e., to hear evidence only, to hear
evidence and recommend resolution, etc ..... See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:4
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ence by directing the referee to address only specified issues in the case, it need
not. The trial court is equally empowered to refer all disputed issues to the ref-
eree for resolution." Regardless of any limitation placed upon the scope of the
reference, however, the trial court can limit the referee's function by restricting
the reference to particular acts, for instance to receive and report evidence on-
ly. 5 It is important to note, however, that any court-imposed limitations are
purely discretionary. Although the referring court retains the discretion to
limit both the scope and function of the reference it need not always do so - it
is free to restrict or not restrict the reference as it deems appropriate. 6
Unless specifically limited by the trial court's order of reference, Rule
53(c) confers upon referees certain broad "powers" which are co-extensive with
those normally attributable to a trial judge. 1 Pursuant to that specified
''power," a referee may discharge duties normally performed by the court
itself. Thus, for example, the referee can conduct "judicial-type" hearings in
place of the judge and perform other acts which are generally judicial in nature
such as compelling the attendance of witnesses, ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, administering oaths, and interrogating witnesses.4"
At first blush, the delegation of these "judicial powers" to non-judges ap-
pears somewhat problematic. The Ohio Constitution squarely places all
judicial power in the judiciary, therefore, any attempt to delegate that power
raises serious constitutional concerns.49 The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure can-
not alter or diminish a court's judicial power since the Ohio Supreme Court's
rule-making authority is limited, pursuant to Section 5(B) of Article IV of the
Ohio Constitution, to prescribing rules of "practice and procedure."5
The staff notes to Rule 53 indicate that the rule contemplates that a
referee will do no more than "aid" a trial court in expediting its business."
Despite an apparent grant of judicial "power" to the non-judicial referee, Rule
53 does not contemplate that reference will operate as a substitute for the trial
'Rule 53(A) specifically authorizes the appointment of a referee "to hear an issue or issues" in any case in
which there is no right to a jury trial. OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(AI.
15See supra note 42.
"See OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(A).
"See supra note 42. Notably, while many of the referee's powers are coextensive with those of the trial
court, there are limitations. Thus, while the adjudicatory functions of a referee and a court can be similar.
the referee has no jurisdictional power to actually determine the rights and liabilities between the parties. See
Wolff v. Kreiger, 48 Ohio App. 2d 153, 356 N.E.2d 316 (1976).
"OHIo R. Civ. P. 53(C).
"Judicial power is constitutionally vested in the "Supreme Court, Court of Appeals. Courts of Common
Pleas and divisions thdfeof, and any such other courts inferior to Supreme Court as may from time to time
be established by law." OHIO CONs'r. art. IV. § I.
-"OHIo CoNsr. art. IV, § 5: Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 83. 346 N.E.2d 286 11976): State v. Hughes. 41
Ohio St. 2d 208. 324 N.E.2d 731 11975): State v. Wailer, 48 Ohio App. 123. 356 N.E.2d 306 119751. ajftd. 47
Ohio St. 2d 52, 351 N.E.2d 195 (1976).
"See Dillon v. Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 606 (1927): Toulmin v. Becker. 94 Ohio App. 524. 115
N.E.2d 705 (1952).
Spring, 19861
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court in the exercise of its judicial "decision-making" function. 2 To assume
that a referee functions as judge merely because the enumerated "powers" of
the referee as contained in Rule 53 appear "judicial" in nature3 seriously
mistakes the fundamental nature of the reference device.14 To fully understand
this functional distinction and its significance, one must first consider the man-
ner in which a successful reference is meant to operate in practice.
B. The Mechanics of Judicial Reference - Ohio Civil Rule 53(E)
Subsection E of Rule 53 sets out a relatively simple mechanism through
which a successful court ordered reference is accomplished. Regardless of the
nature or scope of a reference, the referee, after hearing the matter referred,
"shall" prepare and submit to the referring trial court a written "report upon
the matters submitted to him by the order of reference."5 Within fourteen
days of the submission of this report, either party in the litigation may file with
the court written objections to the content of the report." The court is then
ready to proceed with its disposition of the case. The court may "adopt, reject
or modify the report; hear additional evidence; return the report to the referee
with instructions; or hear the matter itself."57
On its face, the above-quoted portion of Rule 53(E) outlines the
parameters of the judge-referee relationship. The referring trial court retains
absolute discretion to act concerning the report as it deems appropriate. 8 A
court could, for example, entirely reject the report and subsequently decide to
hear the matter itself59 with no deference to the findings or conclusions con-
"A distinction must be made among various judicial functions. For example, a referee can conduct a judicial
type hearing and rule on evidentiary questions (both "judicial functions"). but cannot actually affect any
litigant's rights and liberties (also a "judicial function"). See Wolff v. Krieger. 48 Ohio App. 2d 153. 356
N.E.2d 316 (1977) IA referee's authority is limited to conducting a hearing, taking testimony and reporting
the evidence and/or its recommendations to the trial court).
"Id.
'Ald. See also Ivywood Apartments v. Bennett, 51 Ohio App. 2d 209. 367 N.E.2d 1205 (19761 inoting that a
referee is not a judge and can not perform the duties of a judge). This is a significant change from thc
original statutory reference scheme in Ohio. Mennell Mining Co. v. Slosser, 140 Ohio St. 445, 45 N.E.2d 3t06
11942). "ITIrial before referees is a substitute for a trial in court. The findings of the facts is. in effect, the
special verdict of the jury. The conclusions of law of referee stand as the ... decision of the court: and if not
set aside, a judgment follows of course." Id. at 446. 45 N.E.2d at 307.
"OHio R. (iv. P. 531E)Il). The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted this subsection to require referees to
"perform certain mandatory duties." State ex rel. Lesher v. Kainrad. 65 Ohio St. 2d 68. 70, 417 N.E.2d 1382,
1384 (198 1). For the text of this subsection see infra note 133.
"OHio R. ('iv. P. 53(E)12). The relevant portion of the rule provides that "a party may. within fourteen days
of the filing of the report, serve and file written objections to the referee's report." Id. The 1985 amendment
to Rule 53 provides that "Iilf objections are timely served and filed by any party, any other party may serve
and file objections within ten (10) days from the date on which the first objections were filed, or within the
time otherwise prescribed by this rule. whichever period last expires." Id.
;7Id.
-Id.
Id. See also Mayle v. Mayle. No. 84-6268 (Ohio Ct. App. filed Feb. 13. 1984): Bakaitis v. Bakailis, No.
83-7997 (Ohio Ct. App. Filed May 23, 1983): Jeewek v. Jeewek. No. 81-43018 (Ohio Ct. App. Filed May 2 1,
1981).
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tained in the referee's report ° In this scenario, the reference is merely advisory
at best since the court is not obliged to give any effect to the report of the
referee.6' It is important to note that despite a Rule 53 reference, final
"decision-making" remains a "judicial," trial court function.62
This unique functional relationship between judge and referee defines the
nature of reference and, simultaneously, protects the procedural scheme
against any charge of unlawful delegation of judicial power.63 Mandatory trial
court acceptance of the referee's report and recommendation(s), on the other
hand, would seemingly result in a total relinquishment of the court's judicial
"decision-making" function to a non-judicial person. The reference device is
saved from this infirmity because the trial courts retain absolute and seemingly
unfettered discretion to act as they wish subsequent to the reference. Thus,
ultimate judicial power and judicial "decision-making" remain intact despite
the reference.
Although "decision-making" power remains in the trial court, realistically
there is very little incentive for the trial court to completely disregard the re-
port of the referee absent any special circumstances." The "reviewing" court is
also the "referring" court and is rarely inclined to reject the fruits of its own
reference. To protect against this natural tendency toward a defacto delega-
tion,67 Rule 53 specifically provides that the referee's report has no independent
significance absent affirmative adoption by the trial court and is effective and
enforceable "only when approved and entered as a matter of record by the
court."' 61 This provision of the rule does not prohibit a court from adopting a
'OHio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(2).
"Id. See also Conn Construction Co. v. Department of Transportation, 14 Ohio App. 3d 90, 94, 470 N.E.2d
176, 180 (1983); Nolte v. Nolte, 60 Ohio App. 2d 227, 229-32, 396 N.E.2d 807, 810-11 (1978); Berry v.
Berry, 50 Ohio App. 2d 137, 139-41, 361 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1977); Wolff v. Kreiger, 48 Ohio App. 2d
153, 155-56, 356 N.E.2d 316, 318-19 (1976).
61t is important to remember that a reference in no way alters a court's jurisdictional power to determine the
rights and liabilities of litigants. See supra note 47. Judicial "decision-making" is the court's constitutionally
granted power. It is clearly a judicial function to determine the facts in a controversy between adverse par-
ties, to apply the law to the facts, and to render a final binding judgment. Incorporated Village of Fairview v.
Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N.E. 865 (1905); Staples v. Sprogue, 31 Ohio L. Rep. 120 (1929), affd, 34 Ohio
App. 354 (1930). See generally 16 0. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 332 etseq. (1979).
" Without question, a judge cannot delegate his judicial power to a non-judicial third person in the absence
of specific authority. Demereaux v. State, 35 Ohio App. 418, 172 N.E. 551 (1930). See generally 16 0. JuR.
3D Constitutional Law § 370 (1979) citing 22 0. JuR. 3D Courts and Judges § 51 (1979).
"See supra note 63.
'See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
'Given the limited nature of the equity court's inquiry, there was special need for the referee in the ad-
judicatory process, see supra note 28, and courts seemed inclined to accept the work of the referee. In Ohio.
however, reference now seems linked to the search for enhanced judicial efficiency. See supra notes 8, 28.
Even now, though, there are built-in constraints which deter a court from rejecting the results of a reference.
See, e.g., Pinkerson v. Pinkerson, 7 Ohio App. 3d 319, 455 N.E.2d 693 (1982) (where the court recognized
the docket pressures that bear on the state's trial courts).
b7 Id.
"OOHto R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5).
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referee's report and recommendation(s). 69 A trial court is still free to rely upon
the report and recommendation(s) in its entirety, but it must first affirmatively
adopt the report as its own. Thus, the trial court (and not the referee) ultimate-
ly retains the exclusive power to decide upon the rights and liabilities of the lit-
igants.
C. The Developing Case Law
Despite the careful theoretical allocation of judicial responsibilities be-
tween the trial court and its referee pronounced in Rule 53, problems
developed in practice soon after the rule was promulgated in 1974. These prob-
lems required a clarification of the relationship between the referring court, the
referee and the referee's report. Although Rule 53 expressly requires the trial
court to "approve" a referee's report, 0 the rule is silent concerning how such
approval is to be given. Additionally, the original rule establishes no guidelines
concerning the appropriate form of the referee's report.7' In light of these two
deficiencies, some Ohio referees drafted their reports in the form of a final
judgment without any accompanying explanation. 2 This problem was
magnified when some trial courts did no more than sign the report, thereby
"adopting" it as their own.73 Critics promptly dubbed this practice "rubber-
stamping" and questioned the propriety of allowing a trial court to "adopt" a
referee's report by signature without any real independent review." While this
practice undoubtedly aids in clearing judicial calendars, it effectively removes
the seat of judicial "decision-making" from the court to the referee and in-
creases the potential for abuse of that judicial power."
The Rule 53 reference device and the developing problem posed by "rub-
ber-stamping" were first considered by the Franklin County Appeals Court in
1975 in the case of Logue v. Wilson.76 Although the appeal was ultimately
'.Seesupra note 56. See also Eisenberg v. Peyton, 56 Ohio App. 2d 144, 381 N.E.2d 1136 119781.
"ee supra note 68.
"This has been partially remedied by the 1985 amendments to Rule 53. See infra note 157 and accompany-
ing text.
rThus, for example, in the seminal case of Logue v. Wilson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 132, 341 N.E.2d 641 (1975),
discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 76-84, the referee's report consisted of the following: "Case
called. Plaintiff and defendant in court. Show cause hearing held. Judgment is rendered for plaintiff for writ
of replevin for property described." Id. at 132, 341 N.E.2d at 642.
'"n Logue, the trial court adopted the referee's report on the same day it was filed by entering the following
notation on the report: "Irleferee's report approved. Jenkins" Id.
"See infra text beginning at note 83.
"A corollary problem focuses on the due process rights of the litigants. When a court abdicates its judicial
function, the parties to the action are deprived of a trial before the court on the basic issues in the litigation.
This concern was expressed most recently in the federal court system over the use of magistrates in certain
contexts. See. e.g., TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972), quoting La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). In 1980, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) (1976), in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980),
reh'g denied. 448 U.S. 916 11980). Much of the Raddatz opinion deals with the due process considerations.
45 Ohio App. 2d 132, 341 N.E.2d 641 (1975). The use of the term "rubber-stamping" first appears in
Logue.
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decided on other grounds," the court took the opportunity to address the
reference procedure used in the case and concluded that the reference was im-
proper for several reasons.78 First, the court found that the report itself was
deficient because it was worded as a judgment and, further, contained no state-
ment of the basis for the decision. 9 In addition, the trial court disregarded the
fourteen day period during which the plaintiff could object to the report and
entered judgment on the report the same day it was received."0
The Logue decision is significant for a number of reasons. First, the court
affirmed the principal clearly articulated throughout Rule 5381 that the final
judgment in cases of reference must be that of the trial court and not that of
the referee." In affirming this principal, the court warned against construing
Rule 53 to grant power to the referee to render a "judgment which has not
received the independent analysis of the court."83 The court specifically de-
nounced "rubber-stamping," a practice which it said failed to comply with
either the "requirements or spirit of Civil Rule 53."8
To assure "independent analysis," the Logue Court focused on both the
form and content of the referee's report which, in the court's view, should not
be worded as a judgment." Rather, it should contain "sufficient information
from which the [trial] judge may render his own decision," and at a minimum
requires "a statement of the basis of his [referee's] findings and recommenda-
tion(s)."8 6 While the court did not elaborate further concerning the amount of
detail a referee's report must contain to enable a court to render its "own deci-
sion,"8" the intent behind the Logue decision is clear. Even in cases of general
reference, the trial court alone has the ultimate judicial power to actually
decide the merits of the case. The referee's report merely provides the basis
upon which the court should make its own independent evaluation. In this
respect, the Logue opinion suggests a very mechanistic view of the referee's
report - it is no more than the procedural tool through which the trial court
can more efficiently accomplish its ultimate judicial function, that is, its
7 The appeal was dismissed for jurisdictional reasons. The appellate court found that it was without jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal because the trial court's entry of judgment disposed of less than all the pending claims
and thus the trial court's judgment did not constitute a final appealable order. Id. at 136. 341 N.E.2d at 643.
"Id. at 136, 341 N.E.2d at 644. Seesupra note 72.
" Id.
mid.
"See supra note 68.
2Logue. 45 Ohio App. 2d at 136, 341 N.E.2d at 644.
Id.
Id.
"The court characterized the report as an "important" part of the reference procedure. Id.
" Id.
"The court's failure to elaborate its general concern contributed to the need for more specific guidelines in
the rule itself. See infra text beginning at note 157.
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Just two years later in the case of Ivywood Apartments v. Bennett,9 the
same Franklin County Court of Appeals expanded the views expressed in its
Logue opinion. The court began in Ivywood by reiterating the concern it ex-
pressed but did not fully address in Logue, that lower courts must strictly
adhere to the fourteen day period during which a party retains the right to ob-
ject to the referee's report." In the court's view, failure to strictly comply with
the fourteen day objection period prevented the trial court from giving ade-
quate "independent" consideration to the report,9' and denied the appellant his
right to file objections.9"
While the court in Ivywood could have relied solely upon the rationale of
Logue, it instead injected into the consideration the additional notion of
fairness to the litigants declaring that "[tihe nub of the issue,... is that a hear-
ing before a referee is not fair and complete until a judge, following indepen-
dent and careful consideration, along with an opportunity to review objec-
tions, has acted upon the referee's report."93 As was true with Logue, the
analysis in the Ivywood devision leaves much to be desired. The opinion adds
little to the requirement in Logue of "independent analysis." In addition, the
Ivywood decision fails to fully articulate the basis of its fairness concern, which
is seemingly grounded in some vague notion of due process.94 Despite these
weaknesses, the two cases highlight the importance of independent "decision-
making" by the trial court, and establish the initial functional distinction be-
tween judge and referee in cases of general reference. Both cases were widely
cited and followed by other Ohio appeals courts in the years immediately
following the decision.95
"The Franklin County Court's concern with the reference procedure was further illustrated in Wellborn v.
K-Beck Furniture Mart, Inc., 54 Ohio App. 2d 65, 375 N.E.2d 61 (1977). It was noted that a court could
follow a referee's recommended court of action but must "reduce that recommendation to a judgment by a
proper judgment entry. Merely stating that the report is approved does not constitute a judgment." Id. at 66.
375 N.E.2d at 62.
'"51 Ohio App. 2d 209, 367 N.E.2d 1205 (1976).
-Id. at 214, 367 N.E.2d at 1208.
S'Id.
2 d. A litigant's right to file objections to a referee's report is an important and integral procedural safeguard
which ensures judicial independence in cases of general reference. Rule 53 objections are not merely intend-
ed to preserve error made during the evidentiary hearing. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
'Ivywood. 51 Ohio App. 2d at 214, 367 N.E.2d at 1208. See also Pinkerson v. Pinkerson, 7 Ohio App. 3d
319, 320, 455 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1982) (where the court characterizes Rule 53(E) procedures as being "de-
signed to protect the rights of all litigants").
,The Ivywood decision also contains veiled references to what might be construed as an equal protection
issue. "lAlppellant did not have adequate opportunity to file objections to the referee's report. The right to
object, pursuant to Civil Rule 53, was improperly denied appellant, while granted other civil litigants."
Ivywood, 51 Ohio App. at 212, 367 N.E.2d at 1208. Like the fairness question, however, the Ivvwoodopin-
ion fails to adequately develop any basis for the court's thinking.
"See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Peyton, 56 Ohio App. 2d 144, 381 N.E.2d 1136( 1978); Nolte v. Nolte, 60 Ohio App.
2d 227, 396 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Wellborn v. K-Beck Furniture Mart, Inc., 54 Ohio App. 2d 65, 375 N.E.2d
61 (1977); White v. White, 50 Ohio App. 2d 263, 362 N.E.2d 1013 (1977); Wolff v. Kreiger, 48 Ohio App. 2d
153, 356 N.E.2d 316 (1976).
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By 1980, the developing case law seemed clear and consistent. The "rub-
ber-stamping" abuse initially identified and addressed in the Logue and Ivy-
wood cases was uniformly condemned. Judicial attention continued to focus
on the form of the referee's report97 and on the timing of trial court action sub-
sequent to the reference.98 A referee could no longer enter a report in the form
of a judgment to be approved by the trial court. The report had to contain a
statement of the basis for the decision sufficient to enable the court to make its
own independent determination.99 Nor could any trial court action on the
report be taken prior to the expiration of the fourteen day objection period.'"
It is important to note again that, during this time period, judicial concern
with the reference device stemmed primarily from the dual concerns ar-
ticulated in Logue and Ivywood - judicial integrity and procedural fairness.
Despite wide acceptance and support of these principles, courts soon faced
other interpretation problems in the Rule 53 context.
In Keatley v. United National Bank and Trust Co. ' , the Stark County
Court of Appeals considered the relationship between the filing of Rule
53(E)(2) objections and subsequent appellate review of the merits of the action.
In that case, the trial court entered a judgment adopting the referee's report
and recommendations. Neither party filed objections to the report and recom-
mendations prior to the court's adoption of the report. Despite the failure to
file objections to the referee's report, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the
court's entry of final judgment. The issue presented on appeal was whether the
plaintiffs failure to file Rule 53 objections to the report of the referee preclud-
ed subsequent appeal of issues that could have been raised before the trial
court but were not.
In answering the question, the court held that the filing of Rule 53 objec-
tions was a mandatory prerequisite to any appellate review of issues which
could have been raised by objection to the trial court.0 2 In so holding, the court
found that the objection requirement in Rule 53 embodies the general eviden-
tiary requirement that error must be preserved by objection in the trial court.0 3
The court opined that the purpose of Rule 53 objections is to relieve the trial
court of the responsibility to review sua sponte the referee's report and recom-
'See supra note 95.
"'See, e.g., Nolte v. Nolte, 60 Ohio App. 2d 227, 396 N.E.2d 807 11978): Wellborn v. K-Beck Furniture. Inc..
54 Ohio App. 2d 65, 375 N.E.2d 61 (1977).
"Seesupra rate 95. Seealso Berry v. Berry, 50 Ohio App. 2d 137, 139-41, 361 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1977).
"See supra note 97.
"'See supra note 98.
'"68 Ohio App. 2d 198. 428 N.E.2d 158 (19801.
"'Id. at 198-99, 428 N.E.2d at 158-59.
""Id. "In our view, the requirement of preserving a claim of error hy making an appropriate obeciion in the
trial court is the concept captured by the objection requirement in Civil Rule 531FI." Id.
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mendations prior to its adoption:
We have carefully considered the alternate view of this appeal which is
that the trial judge had the sua sponte responsibility to review the
referee's four-paged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to veri-
fy, to his own satisfaction, the correctness thereof. We reject this view. It
is our opinion that the function of Civil Rule 53(E)(2), which requires ob-
jection to the referee's report, is to relieve the trial court of that responsi-
bility. 104
In holding that the trial court had no independent responsibility to review
the referee's report, the court in Keatley implicitly expressed a view of the
referee-judge relationship out of step with that of its sister courts. The clear
teaching of Logue and its progeny was that final "decision-making" authority
resides only in the trial court and not in the referee.'"5 The procedures set out in
Rule 53 itself were designed to protect against usurpations of trial court
"decision-making" authority and to ensure the procedural fairness of the ad-
judicatory process."° In contrast, the Keatley majority determined that trial
court review of the referee's report was triggered only when one of the litigants
filed objections. Absent such objection, the trial court was free to simply adopt
the referee's report and recommendations and enter judgment without in-
dependent consideration.' 7 Thus, a party's failure to object to the referee's
report completely relieves the trial court of any responsibility to verify the ac-
curacy of its own judicial decision. It is difficult to accept this result without a
corresponding willingness to also accept a functional realignment of the trial
judge-referee relationship. Absent any real review, the final decision is that of
the referee and not that of the trial court. This view of the reference process is
clearly at odds with the overwhelming weight of the then existing authority.'0 8
In the 1982 case of Normandy Place Associates v. Beyer, "09 the Ohio
Supreme Court erased any existing ambiguity surrounding the proper inter-
pretation of the judge-referee relationship as embodied in Rule 53. In that case,
i"Id.
""See supra text accompanying notes 76-95.
"'See lsupra text accompanying notes 82-93.
*It is interesting to note that Judge Rutherford's strong dissent in Keatley fails to specifically address the
question of a trial court's responsibility to independently review the referee's report and recommendationis).
Instead. he focused on the reviewability of the judgment at the appellate level and concluded that an appel-
late court was free to review the lower court decision and judgment for any plain error apparent on its face
despite any failure to object below. KeatleyV 68 Ohio App. 2d at 208, 428 N.E.2d at 164 (Rutherford, J., dis-
senting).
I am aware of the fact that a Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretionary power ought not,
generally. to consider matters not called to the attention of the trial court: but, I do not read Civil
Rule 531E1 to preclude exercise of discretionary power in the instant case because no objection was
made to errors, which, in my opinion ... appear on the face of the report, and to errors of commis-
sion, I feel. to be of such magnitude that justice requires they be given consideration.
Id.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 76- 100.
'"2 Ohio St. 3d 102, 443 N.E.2d 161 119821.
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the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the same issue originally tackled by the ap-
pellate court in the Keatley"0 case, that is, whether the filing of Rule 53(E) ob-
jections to a referee's report is a prerequisite to subsequent appellate review of
the findings and/or recommendations subsequently adopted by the trial
court.'" The Ohio Supreme Court held that the failure to file objections to a
referee's report does not operate as a waiver of the issue on appeal."' In so
holding, the Court expressly disapproved of the holding in Keatley."'
In reaching this result, the majority stressed that the rule regarding the
preservation of error by objection"' must be read in conjunction with Rule
53(E)(2)." ' They relied upon the permissive construction normally afforded the
word "may" contained in the rule" 6 to conclude that the rule "does not man-
date the filing of objections to a referee's report.""' 7 Despite the court's
technically narrow holding in Beyer, the dual concerns underlying Logue and
its progeny are at the heart of the Beyer decision as well. The first concern
deals with the nature of the reference device and its resulting impact on the
overall fairness of the adjudicatory process. In the view of the court in Beyer,
the right at stake in the case, meaningful appellate review, was a significant
right."' Under Keatley, if a party failed to file Rule 53 objections his appeal
was barred. However, because of the absence of a clear legislative warning to
litigants specifically outlining the consequences of their failure to file Rule 53
objections, the court in Beyer was reluctant to deprive litigants of "such a
substantial right as the right of appeal.""' 9
In addition, the Beyer opinion suggests an underlying concern with
"rubber-stamping" - the defacto delegation problem previously discussed.'2
Couched as concern for the "high regard [for] . . . the function of the
judiciary," the Supreme Court noted that it is "the primary duty of the [triall
"The record of the Beyer decision was certified for review and final determination to the Ohio Supreme
Court by the Montgomery County Court of Appeals which concluded that its decision in Beyer conflicted
with the judgment of the Stark County Court of Appeals in Keatley v. United National Bank and Trust. 68
Ohio App. 2d 198, 428 N.E.2d 158 (1980).
'The appellants in Beyer argued that the failure to specifically object to certain language contained in the
referee's report precluded appellate review of that same question. Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 443 N.E.2d at
163. Their argument was obviously premised on the well established rule that only errors which are brought
to the attention of the trial court are reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio
St. 2d 41, 322 N.E.2d 629 (1975).
"'Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 103, 443 N.E.2d at 163.
"'See supra text accompanying note 104 for the court's holding in Keatley.
"1See. e.g.. Stores Realty Co., 41 Ohio St. 2d 41, 322 N.E.2d 629.
"'Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 104, 443 N.E.2d at 163.
"""A party may. within fourteen days of the filing of the report, serve arid file written ohjections to the
referee's report." OHni R. Civ. P. 53(E)(2) lemphasis added).
":Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 443 N.E.2d at 163.
1"Id.
11-1d.
-"See supra text accompanying notes 76- 100.
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court, and not the referee, to act as judicial officer." 2' Like the Logue court,,"
the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity for independent review of the
referee's report.'23 This review is the procedural mechanism to ensure against
usurpation of the trial court's judicial "decision-making" function:
In order for the trial court to maintain its independence, it is of utmost im-
portance that it carefully examine any report before it for errors. Accord-
ingly, we reject any concept which would suggest that a trial court may in
any way abdicate its function as judge over its own acts. We therefore
hold that, even in the absence of an objection to a referee's report, the trial
court has the responsibility to critically review and verify to its own
satisfaction the correctness of the result.'24
The Supreme Court's concern for the "independence" of the trial court,
and its strong language refusing to sanction any abdication of the trial court's
judicial function, suggests a higher regard for the continued integrity of the
judicial process than for judicial economy.'25 When coupled with the Supreme
Court's concern over the procedural fairness of the process, the case presents a
clearly drawn functional line between the judge and referee.
Actual judicial "decision-making" authority rests solely in the court and is
not to be diminished in any way by the reference. Every judicial decision must
be that of the trial court and not that of the referee, and these decisions must
result from the exercise of "independent trial court judgment" even when a
litigant fails to object to the report.'26 Significantly, the litigants' action (in ob-
jecting) or inaction (in failing to object) does not affect the allocation of
ultimate judicial "decision-making" authority which remains in the trial
court.'27 In this respect, the exercise of independent "decision-making" by the
trial court is both absolute and mandatory.
The functional distinction between judge and referee articulated in the
case law preserves the reference device from a charge of unlawful delegation of
judicial power. However, in practice it is not easy to achieve the delicate proce-
dural balance created to preserve the rule. Although the Beyer decision man-
dates judicial independence, it fails to articulate practical standards preserving
such independence and leaves a number of other related questions unan-
swered.
Can the trial court accomplish the independent critical review mandated
'"Beyer. 2 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 443 N.E.2d at 164.
'-2See Logue. 45 Ohio App. 2d at 136, 341 N.E.2d at 644.
"'Beyer. 2 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 443 N.E.2d at 164.
1d.
"'This is especially so given the Beyer dissent's concern with the loss of judicial efficiency which they feel
will stem from the majority holding. See id. at 107, 443 N.E. 2d at 165 JKrupansky, J., dissenting).
'
2
°See id. at 105, 443 N.E.2d at 164.
1 Id.
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by the decision without rehearing (or at least reviewing) the evidence initially
heard by the referee? Can a reviewing trial court give deference to any aspect
of the referee's report and maintain its function as an independent decision-
maker? Can the requirement of independent "decision-making" be reconciled
with the underlying purpose of a reference of increasing judicial efficiency?
The language of the original version of Rule 53 offers no help in resolving the
dilemma. However, the recent amendments to Rule 53 attempt to address and
answer these concerns by adding detailed requirements for the content of a
report and by articulating standards for the reviewing trial court. 2"
This article continues its analysis by examining the recent amendments to
Rule 53 and their relationship to the existing standards set out in the case law
in the context of three important and related questions. First, when is the
report itself sufficient to enable the reviewing trial court to satisfy the indepen-
dent review requirement? Second, what standard is a reviewing trial court to
apply when reviewing a referee's report. Is the court free to defer to any por-
tion of the report? Finally, what relation, if any, does the use and availability
of the transcript of the evidence presented by the parties at the hearing before
the referee have in safeguarding the independence of the trial court? The first
two questions are closely related and will be addressed initially. The impor-
tance and function of the transcript in the trial court review process will then
be assessed.
III. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE REFEREE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
A. The Case Law
Beginning with the decision in Logue v Wilson,t29 Ohio courts have con-
sistently viewed the referee's report as the medium through which a successful
reference is accomplished. 30 If a trial court hopes to follow the principles
established in the previously discussed case law' and exercise truly indepen-
dent "decision-making" in cases of reference, then the referee's report must
play the primary role in ensuring the independence of the court's "decision-
making" process. Absent any objections,' the court's independent analysis
and decision will normally be based on the referee's report.33
As originally enacted and as amended, Rule 53 (E)(l) mandates that the
" See infra text beginning at note 157.
1"45 Ohio App. 2d 123, 341 N.E.2d 641 (1975).
'"See supra text beginning at note 76.
131 Id.
,"Pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 53(E)(2), the trial court retains the discretion to rehear all or part of the
evidence originally heard by the referee. See supra note 56. Additionally, the trial court may have a
transcript of the referee's hearing available for review before ruling on any objections. OHiO R. Civ. P.
53(E)(1). See infra note 134 for the text of that subsection of the rule.
"'See infra text beginning at note 174.
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referee prepare and file with the trial court a report upon the matters submit-
ted by the order of reference.'34 However, the original version of the rule
neither required nor suggested any particular form or content of the referee's
report. To some extent this omission contributed to the "rubber-stamping"
problems previously addressed. 3 ' In part, this shortcoming in the rule was
remedied by subsequent judicially created requirements for an "adequate"
referee's report.
The initial statement concerning the requisite content of a referee's report
was first articulated in 1975 in the Logue decision discussed previously.36 Em-
phasizing its general concern for the "independence" of the judicial "decision-
making" function,'37 the Logue Court suggested that the report of the referee
must contain sufficient "information" to allow the trial court to render its own
independent decision3 ' - a standard that a report prepared in the form of a
judgment did not meet.'39 While it made clear that a referee's report couched in
the form of a final judgment was deficient,' the Logue Court offered little
guidance concerning just how much "information" a report must contain to
enable the trial court to independently decide the disputed issues in the case.
In 1978, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals addressed this elusive
issue in Nolte v. Nolte. "I In Nolte, the appellate court considered a challenge
to a lower court's decision which had been based on deficiencies in a referee's
report upon which the trial court relied in rendering its final judgment.' 42 The
Nolte decision refines the general standard articulated in Logue 43 by focusing
on the sufficiency (or insufficiency) of the factual predicate for the recom-
mended conclusions contained in the referee's report. Concerned with the trial
court's ability to independently review the referee's report, the appellate court
11OHio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(1). This subsection provides that:
Itlhe referee shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. He
shall file the report with the clerk of the court and shall mail a copy to the parties. In an action on the
merits of an issue to be tried without a jury, he shall file with his report a transcript of the proceedings
and of the evidence only if the court so directs.
Id.
'
35See supra text beginning at note 76.
'13See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
'"'Logue, 45 Ohio App. 2d at 136, 341 N.E.2d at 644.
'1d. "While it is not inconsistent with Rule 53 that the referee recommend a proposed judgment to the
referring court, it should not be worded as a judgment and it should contain sufficient information from
which the judge may render his own decision. " Id. (emphasis added). "The report of the referee at a
minimum requires a statement of the basis of his findings and recommendations in order that the judge may
make an independent analysis of its validity . I..." d.
1
39
1d.
140Id.
"'60 Ohio App. 2d 227, 396 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
"
2The appellant in Nolte asserted that it was an error of law for the trial judge "to accept, adopt, and jour-
nalize a report of a referee ... when that report makes no finding of fact to support the conclusions and
recommended entry, and where the trial judge makes no independent findings of fact to support the journal
entry." Id. at 229, 396 N.E.2d at 809.
" 
3See supra note 138.
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determined that "when a referee's report contains a conclusion regarding an
issue in the case, the facts that lead to that conclusion must also be contained
in the report."'
Although the Nolte case was decided prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Beyer, "5 its requirement that referees articulate underlying facts as part
of their reports is consistent with the notion of independent trial court analysis
contained in the Beyer line of cases.'1 Since the trial court's decision, absent
objection, is based entirely on the referee's report,"" the trial court can in-
dependently assess the validity of any recommended conclusion only when the
factual basis for that conclusion is also incorporated as part of the report.
Otherwise, the trial court is, in essence, abdicating its judicial "decision-
making" function to the referee.' 8
The requirement that referees articulate the underlying facts as part of
their reports is now well established in the case law' 9 and, in most instances,
presents little difficulty in application. A referee's report recommending the
adoption of certain legal conclusions must contain the necessary factual
predicate for such legal conclusions. Without the necessary supporting facts,
the report would supplant rather than aid the trial court in accomplishing its
"decision-making" function. For example, in a proceeding for divorce, Rule
75(L) of the Ohio Civil Rules requires that no judgment be entered upon
testimony that is not corroborated by additional credible evidence.'50 If the
referee's report recommends that the trial court enter a judgment of divorce
for the moving party, the report must contain sufficient factual findings to
allow the trial judge to "independently" determine that the entry of that judg-
ment is appropriate. Essentially, the trial judge must be able to
"independently" determine from the referee's report that the moving party has
established the legal elements of the cause of action. Thus, at a minimum, the
report must contain the finding that there is other credible corroborative
evidence to support the petitioner's allegations. Only then can the trial court
conclude that the judgment for divorce is appropriate. Where the referee's
report fails to state the necessary factual predicate, the trial court is incapable
of "independently" determining whether the recommended judgment for
'"Nolte, 60 Ohio App. 2d at 230, 396 N.E.2d at 808-09.
"'Nolte was decided in 1978 while Beyer was decided four years later in 1982.
'"See supra text beginning at note 109.
"'See infra text beginning at note 174.
"'While the Court must review the report for legal errors which appear on its face, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 192-96, it is not judicial "decision-making" in the first instance. At the trial court level, fact-finding
is an integral part of the judicial "decision-making" function. Trials are necessary because a court can apply
substantive law to determine the rights of the parties only after "it finds the facts ...." J. FRANK. COURTSON
TRIAL, at 3 (1970). See also supra note 62.
"'See, e.g., Ferrie v. Ferrie, 2 Ohio App. 3d 122, 440 N.E.2d 1229 (1981).
'"ffOo R. Civ. P. 75(L).
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divorce is proper."'
The "factual predicate" requirement set out in Nolte is not limited to legal
conclusions. The Nolte case itself suggests that the requirement applies equally
to legal and factual conclusions contained in the referee's report. That case be-
gan at the trial level when the father-appellee filed a post-divorce decree mo-
tion to modify child custody alleging that the mother's home environment was
"detrimental to the child's physical, mental and emotional health."'5 After
hearing the evidence and testimony presented, the referee concluded that the
home environment of the mother-appellant was dangerous to the child's physi-
cal and emotional development and recommended a change in custody.'53
However, neither the report nor the recommended journal entry contained
any basis for this crucial factual conclusion.'" The appellate court criticized
the trial court for adopting the recommendation of the referee in the absence
of any articulated factual predicate to support the referee's conclusion that the
mother's home environment endangered the child.'5 In effect, the referee and
not the trial court made the decision changing custody. Since it made no clear
statement of the facts, the appellate court found that the referee's report was
insufficient and that the trial judge could not properly adopt its recommended
disposition.'56
B. The Rule 53(E) Amendments
The recent amendments to Rule 53 (E)(5) which specifically mandate that
the factual findings of the referee be sufficient to allow independent analysis
by the trial court partially remedy the shortcomings of Rule 53, as originally
enacted, which failed to specifically address the required content of the
"'The facts of the example parallel those of Ferrie v. Ferrie, 2 Ohio App. 3d 122,440 N.E2d 12291981). In
that case, appellant argued that the referee's report did not contain sufficient information to allow the trial
court to independently determine whether the plaintiff should be granted a divorce. The referee's report in
the case simply stated conclusions and did not mention whether there was any corroboration as required by
Rule 75(L). In reversing the trial court's award of divorce, the court of appeals held that the "report must
contain a brief summary of the underlying facts and corroborative testimony supporting the legal conclusion
that the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce." Id. at 123, 440 N.E.2d at 1231. A number of other cases reach the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Eisenberg, v. Peyton, 56 Ohio App. 2d 144, 381 N.E.2d 1136 (1978) (whenever a
referee's report contains a legal conclusion, but omits the facts necessary to reach that conclusion, the judg-
ment is voidable). See also Nolte, 60 Ohio App. 2d 227, 396 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
'Nolte, 60 Ohio App. 2d at 227, 396 N.E.2d at 808.
153 Id.
"'The referee's report, which was adopted without modification by the trial judge, contained the following
statement: "Itihe Iclourt further finds that based upon the evidence presented to this Iclourt, the child's pres-
ent environment with the defendant-mother endangers significantly his physical and his emotional develop-
ment." Id. at 229, 396 N.E.2d at 809. However, nothing in the report specifically suggested exactly what in
the environment constituted the danger.
'The Nolte opinion makes reference to prior decisions admonishing the Domestic Relations Division of the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for failing to comply with the mandates of Rule 53. Id. at 231,
396 N.E.2d at 810, citing Eisenberg v. Peyton, 56 Ohio App. 2d 144, 381 N.E.2d 1136 (1978); Berry v.
Berry, 50 Ohio App. 2d 137, 361 N.E.2d 1095 (1977). However, the court in Nolte cautions against constru-
ing their "denunciation of the flagrant abuses of Civil Rule 53" as a disapproval of the proper uses of
referees. Nolte, 60 Ohio App. 2d at 231-32, 396 N.E.2d at 810.
"'1d.
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referee's report. The rule as amended requires that "[tihe referee's findings of
fact must be sufficient for the court to make an independent analysis of the
issues and to apply appropriate rules of law in reaching a judgment order."'51
While this addition to Rule 53 seems consistent with the previously discussed
judicial standard,"8 the amendment goes beyond the prior case law by clarify-
ing the method of its application.
The amended rule requires that every referee's report contain findings of
fact sufficient for the trial court to make an "independent analysis."'59 In this
respect, the amended rule merely embraces as its own the general standard first
articulated in Logue. 11 In addition, however, the amended rule amplifies both
the Logue and Nolte decisions by suggesting the nature of the anticipated trial
court analysis of the referee's report. Thus, while the previous case law focused
on the facts necessary to support the "conclusions" contained in the report, 6'
the amended rule specifically requires that the referee's report contain suffi-
cient facts to allow the court to independently analyze "the issues and to apply
appropriate rules of law in reaching a judgment order."'62
This new language in the amended rule suggests a dual focus by the
reviewing trial court. Consistent with the prior case law,63 a referee's report
must contain sufficient findings of fact to allow the trial court to apply the ap-
propriate rules of law to reach its judgment."' In addition, however, the find-
ings of fact must be sufficient to allow the court to make an independent
analysis of the "issues.' 65 Here the amendment seems cryptic at best since the
term "issues" is not defined in the rule and it is unclear whether "issues" refers
only to legal issues or whether it also includes disputed questions of fact.
The use of the conjunctive "and" in the text of the amended rule suggests
an "independent analysis" of some additional disputed issue(s) beyond the
court's mere application of law to fact.'6" It is probably safe to assume that
"issues" does not refer solely to pure questions of law since their resolution
does not necessarily depend upon a factual predicate. 67 The absence of any
'5'OHio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5).
'See supra text beginning at note 136.
"'OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(!.
"See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
"'See supra text accompanying note 144.
"'OHio R. Civ. P. 53B1l5).
"'See supra text beginning at note 136.
"'OHIo R. Civ.P. 53(E5).
10 Id.
1"See supra text accompanying note 157.
"'However, in its deliberation concerning a potential change in substantive law, a court may rely on
"legislative" facts. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 759. 766 (2d ed. 1972); Karst, "Legislativej]cts in Con-
stitutional Litigation," 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 75, 99-100, 109; K. DAvis. ADMiNisTRATiVE LAW TREATiSE §
15.3, at 353 (1958).
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other explanation for including the word "issues" in the amended rule suggests
that the anticipated "independent analysis" extends additionally to issues of
disputed fact. However, this interpretation seems at odds with subsection (6) of
amended Rule 53(E) which allows a court to adopt the referee's proposed find-
ings of fact without any "independent analysis" when there has been no objec-
tion to those findings.'68 With no guidance inherent within the rule itself, the
question of the meaning of the word "issues" in the amended rule will remain
unanswered pending further judicial interpretation.
In so far as the amended rule requires factual findings sufficient to allow
the court to apply the appropriate rules of law in reaching its decision, it is
clearly consistent with the prior judicially created standard previously dis-
cussed.'69 However, Ohio courts have also required that the referee's report
contain sufficient evidence to support factual conclusions contained in that re-
port.'70 Unless the phrase "independent analysis of the issues" is interpreted to
include disputed issues of conclusory fact, the amended rule alters the prior ju-
dicially created requirements for an adequate referee's report - a potentially
disturbing result given the important role that the report plays in maintaining
the functional balance between judge and referee in cases of general
reference."1'
Because of this ambiguity, the amended rule fails to remedy completely
the omission in Rule 53 as it originally stood. While the original rule was silent,
this deficiency was partially remedied by the judicially created standards
previously discussed.'72 The case law requirement that a referee's report con-
tain adequate facts to support both factual and legal conclusions was both
understandable and consistent with the functional roles of judge and referee.
The amended rule seems to abandon this established approach for one that is
arguably less clear than and possibly inconsistent with the prior standard.
Ultimately, any discussion of the "proper" content of the referee's report
leads to consideration of its function in the final adjudicatory process. As
discussed previously, the referee's report was viewed historically as the
mechanism through which the trial court effectuates its "decision-making"
function.'73 However, the recent amendments to Rule 53 suggest a significant
departure from the referee-judge relationship established in the prior case law.
It is this departure which this article next considers.
'See injfa text accompanying note 196.
"'See supra text accompanying note 149.
"'See supra text accompanying note 152.
...See supra text beginning at note 57.
..See supra text beginning at note 136.
'3See supra text beginning at note 40.
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IV. REVIEW OF THE REFEREE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -
"INDEPENDENT DECISIONMAKING"?
As traditionally understood, the relationship between a trial judge and
referee is unlike that between an appellate and trial court. There is little func-
tional similarity between an appellate court, which reviews the decision of a
trial court, and a referring trial court, which "reviews" the report of a referee."r4
Historically, an Ohio trial court does not engage in an "appellate" type review
of the referee's report, at least not as the term is commonly understood.',5
Initially, it is important to note that a trial court need never actually "re-
view" the referee's report.'76 Both the original and amended Rule 53 specifical-
ly authorize the trial court, after objection, to treat the report as it deems ap-
propriate.'" Interestingly, on its face the rule gives the trial court absolute and
apparently unfettered discretion. Regardless of the sufficiency or wisdom of a
referee's report, the trial court may entirely reject it.'78 Any such rejection is
not reviewable on appeal.'79 Additionally, unlike an appellate court which must
review the trial court's decision,'80 the trial court can completely reject the
referee's report and instead elect to make its judicial decision after a de novo
hearing.'8' Moreover, a trial court is not restricted historically by a limited
scope of review requiring deference to the referee's proposed factual findings.
82
"'In reviewing a trial court judgment in Ohio, the court of appeals does not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial judge. Rather, the appellate court determines if the trial court judgment was erroneous. Yomnick
v. Leece-Neville Co., 28 Ohio Op. 2d 344, 188 N.E.2d 610 (1963); Crellin v. Parish, 136 N.E.2d 454 11955).
Even in cases of general reference, the trial court must substitute its judgment for that of the referee since
the referee is merely an aid to the trial court in the exercise of (the trial court's "decision -making" function.
See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
'"Generally, an appellate court reviews the judgment of the trial court solely for legal errors. No new
evidence may be introduced. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709
(1948). The appellate court is limited to the record as it was developing at the trial court level. Cleveland v.
Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 278 N.E.2d 374 (1972). See generally 4 0. JUR. 2D Appellate Review §§
248,499 (196 1). In reviewing questions of fact, the appellate court is limited to determining whether the ver-
dict or findings are supported by substantial evidence or are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Yomnick v. Leece-Neville Co., 28 Ohio Op. 2d 344, 188 N.E.2d 610 (1963); Cleveland Ry. Co. v. O'Reilly,
16 Ohio App. 132 (1920). In contrast, the trial court in considering the report and recommendation(s) of the
referee can hear new evidence, see supra text accompanying notes 57-62, and should weigh the evidence
presented by the litigants. Despite the reference, however, the trial court retains its judicial "decision-
making" power. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88. Interestingly, the trial court-referee relationship
is similar to the long prevalent appeal de novo now abolished by Ohio Appellate Rule 2. See generally 4 0.
JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 13 (1977).
""See OHIo R. CIv. P. 53(E)(2).
"'Id. See supra text beginning at note 56 for a discussion of the applicability of Rule 53(E)(2).
"
8OHto R. Ctv. P. 53(E)2).
"'The trial court's rejection of a referee's report and recommendation(s) pursuant to Rule 53(E)(2) should not
be overturned by the court of appeals given the broad discretion granted to the trial court within Rule 53
itself. Note, however, that the trial court's final judgment may be reviewed upon appeal by the appellate
court pursuant to its normal scope of view.
'"See Ohio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(2).
Ild
"'See supra note 175. Deference to the referee's proposed findings of fact is inconsistent with true, indepen-
dent judicial "decision-making."
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While a trial court's refusal to accept the referee's report and insistence
upon a de novo hearing may decrease judicial efficiency,' 3 such refusal poses
no threat to independent judicial "decision-making."'114 However, when a trial
court fails to properly "review" the referee's findings and/or conclusions in
adopting the referee's recommendations (alluded to previously as "rubber-
stamping""') the principal of judicial independence is threatened. The
developed case law clearly counters this practice and mandates independent
"decision-making" by a reviewing trial court whenever the court adopts the
referee's report as its own."6 Unfortunately, as suggested previously, the "in-
dependent decision-making" standard is not easily implemented. While a
reviewing trial court need not defer to the referee, may it do so if it pleases?
When a reviewing trial court wishes to adopt the referee's report, can it defer
to the referee's findings and/or conclusions or must it "independently" deter-
mine both the legal and factual issues to its own satisfaction?
The original version of Rule 53 does not address the propriety of trial
court deference to the referee but the omission is partially remedied by the
amended rule. While retaining the language of the original rule which confers
discretion on the trial court to act as it deems appropriate subsequent to a
reference,'87 the amended rule adds language which specifically allows a refer-
ring court to adopt a referee's recommendation(s) concerning appropriate legal
conclusions and resolutions of the issues in the case.'88 However, the sanction
of the amended rule contains certain restrictions. Though the trial court is free
to adopt a referee's recommendation(s) regarding the ultimate outcome of the
case, it can not adopt a referee's proposed judgment as its own since the
amendment specifically requires a court to enter its own judgment.' 9
In addition, even when a court wishes to adopt portions of the report, it
must do more than merely "defer" to the conclusions contained therein. The
amended rule specifically requires that, prior to adopting the report, the
reviewing trial court must determine whether there are any "error[s] of law or
other defect[s]" on the face of the report.'90 This determination must take place
"even if no party objects to [such] an error or defect."''
The quoted portion of the amended rule seems to require a mandatory
'See supra note 29.
"Note however that the rejection of the proposed findings of fact on the basis of credibility without rehear-
ing the evidence raises due process concerns. See infra note 257.
"'sSee supra text beginning at note 76.
'" Id.
'See supra text beginning at note 56.
'"Rule 53(E)(5) specifically authorizes that the "Iclourt may adopt the referee's recommendations about ap-
propriate conclusions of law and the appropriate resolution of any issue." OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5).
'""The court shall enter its own judgment of the issues submitted for action and report by the Referee." Id.
1%1d.
191Id.
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form of a limited appellate-type review. While a court may adopt a referee's
recommendation(s) concerning the outcome of the matter, it must nevertheless
independently examine the report for any errors of law or other defects appar-
ent on the face of the report. 9 Thus, while a court may adopt the referee's re-
port, it cannot under any circumstances defer to the legal conclusions con-
tained in the report. The trial court must review the report for any legal defects
that may appear on its face even when no party objects to any portion of the
report.93
In this regard, the amended rule seems consistent with and even codifies
the view of the judge-referee relationship developed in the Logue line of
cases.' The rule specifically prohibits "rubber-stamping" and requires that
each court enter its own independent judgment on the issues submitted for
reference. Like Logue and its progeny, the amended rule ensures that the exer-
cise of judicial "decision-making" power remains squarely in the trial court.
The rule, as amended, also demands a measure of trial court "in-
dependence" by requiring the court to exercise its own judgment on questions
of law even in the absence of an objection to the report.9 The trial court can
not merely defer to the referee in matters concerning questions of law. 96 In a
limited sense, the amendment embraces the view of the judge-referee relation-
ship which underlies the Beyer decision - the action or inaction of the
litigants in no way effects the allocation of judicial power which remains in the
trial court despite a litigant's failure to specifically object to the report.'97
While a court may adopt legal conclusions, what about factual questions
at issue in the reference? Can a court defer to the factual findings contained in
the referee's report and, if so, what becomes of the "independent decision-
making" requirement of Beyer? By implication, the amended rule allows a
reviewing court to adopt the findings of fact of the referee "without further
consideration" unless there is an objection filed by the party opposing the
adoption of the report.'98 Absent objection, the trial court seems free, in
essence, to defer to the referee in regard to matters of disputed fact.
The amended rule seems, then, to draw a distinction between the
"reviewability" of legal and of factual issues. Even absent any objection, the
reviewing trial court must still determine if there are errors of law or "other
11id. This language suggests a review similar to an appellate court's review for legal error in the trial court's
final decision and judgment. See supra notes 174-75.
'"OHio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5).
'"See supra text beginning at note 129.
"'9OHto R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5).
1%Id.
"'See supra text accompanying note 124.
"'OHo R. Civ. P. 53(E)(6).
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defect[s] on the face of the report."'99 However, a court must go beyond the
face of the report to review questions of fact only when a party files an objec-
tion to the action.2 °
At first blush, the amended rule appears to depart from the Beyer require-
ment of an independent trial court review notwithstanding the parties' failure
to object to any portion of the referee's report.2"' However, closer scrutiny of
the Beyer decision suggests that this conclusion is arguable. In discussing the
independence of the trial court, the majority in Beyer speaks of an examination
by the trial court for any possible errors within the "report. ' 202 If this language
merely suggests a review for errors contained on the face of the report, the an-
ticipated review need only be a somewhat limited form of appellate-type review
with some corresponding deference to the referee - essentially the same stan-
dard expressed in the amended rule. This interpretation is inconsistent with
truly independent trial court "decision-making. 2 3
The trial court review of factual findings suggested in Rule 53(E)(6), as
amended, seems to be a form of limited appellate review similar to the review
implemented for administrative agency actions .2 0 This type of limited ap-
pellate review contemplates a review of decisions as previously made by
another court or adjudicatory body. 25 To the extent that the amended rule
contemplates any trial court "review" of issues "decided" by a referee, the rule
seems to depart from the requirement of independent "decision-making. ' 206
Any deference by the trial court to matters "decided" by the referee essentially
removes the "decision-making" function from the trial court. The trial court
becomes a court of review as opposed to being the "deciding" court.
While the notion of a limited appellate-type review seems inconsistent
with "independent" trial court "decision-making," the majority in Beyer hints
of a somewhat more limited view of trial court "independence." In discussing
the proper role of the trial court, the Beyer majority speaks of a trial court ex-
amination of the "report" for any errors contained therein. 07 Within the same
paragraph, however, the Beyer court expressed the additional requirement that
'"See OHio R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5). See also supra text beginning at note 129. "Other defects" would include the
failure to articulate sufficient facts to support legal conclusions.
mSee OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(6).
"
3See supra text accompanying note 124.
-
2Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 443 N.E.2d at 164.
"See supra text beginning at note 70.
'Court review of administrative agency fact-finding is generally very limited in Ohio. See, e.g., New York
Central R.R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 163 Ohio St. 250, 126 N.E.2d 320 (1950). See generally 20.
JUR. 3D Administrative Law §§ 173-78 (1977).
"uSee supra text beginning at note 174.
2
"See supra note 62.
"
1See Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 105, 443 N.E.2d at 644.
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the trial court verify to its satisfaction the correctness of the "result.1 208
Substitution of the word "result" for "report" is an important distinction with
apparent significance. If a trial court is to verify to its own satisfaction the cor-
rectness of the "result," the nature and scope of review necessarily requires less
deference and thus differs markedly from that necessary to simply review the
referee's "report" for errors contained on its face.
2
"
9
The holding of Beyer coupled with the strong language of that decision
suggests an interpretation requiring true independent judicial "decision-
making" and little, if any, deference. This interpretation of the Beyer opinion is
additionally suggested by the dissent in Beyer which criticizes the majority
holding as being counter-productive to the purpose for the reference tool
which is to increase judicial efficiency. 210 By requiring the level of in-
dependence suggested in the Beyer majority opinion, the dissent argues that
the majority has actually increased rather than decreased the workload of an
already overburdened judiciary .2 1 The dissent seems to fear that increased
judicial time will need to be spent in the "reviewing" process.212 The dissenting
justices in Beyer apparently interpreted the majority opinion as requiring a tru-
ly independent "decision-making" procedure which would naturally result in a
more time-consuming judicial process. Unfortunately, the Beyer majority failed
to address this criticism and this omission adds to the difficulty of determining
the full intent of the opinion.
Apart from the theoretical requirements of the majority decision in Beyer,
implementation, as suggested by the Beyer dissent, is problematic.' In con-
trast, the amended rule is anything but ambiguous setting out an understand-
able and easy standard for dealing with the trial court's adoption of recom-
mended findings of fact.
2Nld.
'Review for errors that appear on the face of the report is a review limited to the legal sufficiency of the
report itself. The reviewing trial court would determine if the referee correctly applied the relevant legal doc-
trine to the factual findings made in reaching a recommendation. This review essentially precludes any
review of the referee's factual findings as long as these findings are legally sufficient to support the proposed
result. On the contrary, to review to verify the correctness of the result, the trial court must address the cor-
rectness of the proposed findings of fact which form the predicate for the resolution of the case.
210 ITihe majority's holding defeats the purpose of the use of referees .... The referee system was in-
stituted to facilitate the prompt and efficient resolution of disputes and to alleviate some of the
tremendous overload on trial courts. The majority accomplishes the opposite result by placing the
responsibility upon the trial court to scrutinize the referee's report, search for errors and anticipate all
possible grounds for objection.
Beyer, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 107, 443 N.E.2d at 165 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
This heightened trial court responsibility was also mandated by subsequent appellate court decisions. See,
e.g., Garcia v. Tillack, 9 Ohio App. 3d 222, 459 N.E.2d 918 (1983) citing Normandy Place Assoc. v. Beyer, 2
Ohio St. 3d 103,443 N.E.2d 161 (1984) "The trial judge is then required to review the report and make an in-
dependent analysis of the underlying facts involved in the dispute. It is the duty of the trial judge to critically
review and verify the correctness of the referee's report prior to its adoption." Id. at 223, 459 N.E.2d at 919
(emphasis added).
"'Beyer. 2 Ohio St. 3d at 107, 443 N.E.2d at 165 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
212Id.
'See id. at 106-08, 443 N.E. at 164-66.
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As referenced above, the new rule specifically provides that a trial court:
[m]ay adopt any finding of fact in the referee's report without further con-
sideration unless the party who objects to that finding supports that objec-
tion with a copy of all relevant portions of the transcript from the referee's
hearing or an affidavit about evidence submitted to the referee if no
transcript is available."4
The rule draws a clear distinction between legal and factual questions - the
former must always be independently reviewed and decided by the trial court
but not so the latter. The new language clearly places the initial burden to ini-
tiate review of factual questions upon the parties and not on the trial court.
Without objection, a trial court is free to "adopt" any factual finding of the
referee without considering its correctness. This result is certainly troublesome
if the function of the trial court is to make an independent decision based upon
the report of the referee. It is difficult to conclude that deference to a referee's
proposed findings of fact is consistent with the idea of independent trial court
"decision-making." Unless the Beyer decision is interpreted as requiring
something less than true independent "decision-making," the amended rule
significantly alters the previously well-established functional relationship be-
tween the trial court and the referee.
V. THE RECORD OF THE REFEREE'S HEARING
There is no requirement that a record be made of the proceedings which
are heard before a referee." ' Rule 53 sets forth three requirements which must
be satisfied before a referee is obligated to make a record of the evidentiary
hearing. First, a party must make an affirmative request for a record." 6 This
provision of the rule has been consistently interpreted as being mandatory -
neither the referee nor the referring trial court has the responsibility or obliga-
tion to order that a record of the proceedings be made." 7 The party's request
alone, however, is insufficient to insure maintenance of a record of the hear-
ing. A party must also "guarantee the costs" involved in preparing such a
record.1 ' Further, the referring court must "order" that the referee make a
record of the proceeding. 9
2
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(6).
"'"When a party so requests and guarantees the cost, and the court so orders, the referee shall make a record
of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner as and subject to the same limitations upon a court
sitting without a jury." OHIO R. Ci. P. 531C).
216Id.
"'See, e.g., White v. White, 50 Ohio App. 2d 263, 362 N.E.2d 1013 (1977), "Rule 53(C) places a mandatory
duty upon a party who wants a court reporter to record the evidence at a hearing before a referee, to file a
written motion requesting a court reporter to make a record of the evidence." Id. at 269-70, 362 N.E.2d at
1018.
".OHIo R. Civ. P. 53(C).
2'Id. The trial court's order requiring that a transcript be prepared can be made by individualized journal
order in a particular case or class of cases, by a blanket journalized order of reference, or by any applicable
local rule.
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The transcript of the proceedings before the referee plays an important
role in the fairness of the actual adjudicatory proceeding. Without a record of
the evidence adduced at the referee's hearing, a party's right to an independent
decision by the trial court220 and to a meaningful review by an appellate court is
all but eliminated.22" ' A trial court is severely limited in its ability to "in-
dependently" decide a case absent a transcript of the proceedings before the
referee. Without such a transcript, a trial court is practically limited to review-
ing the record solely for any legal errors which may appear on the face of the
referee's report since the trial court has no basis upon which to review ques-
tions of disputed fact.222 If the court wishes to independently review the pro-
posed findings, the case must be remanded to the referee or, alternatively, the
trial court must hear the matter de novo to determine the disputed factual
issues.
Rule 53, as originally enacted, did not specifically require the objecting
party to provide the transcript of the proceedings before the referee to the trial
court. Despite the rule's original silence, Ohio courts have consistently held
that an objecting party must provide a transcript of the referee's hearing
whenever the objections to the report raise factual issues which require a de
novo review of the evidence.223 For example, where the objections of a party go
to the weight of the evidence presented at the referee's hearing, the objecting
"See infra note 222.
2
"See. e.g.. Walker v. Walker, 40 Ohio App. 2d 6, 317 N.E.2d 415 (1974) "Without some record of the rele-
vant testimony adduced at trial, appellant's right to appeal is, for all practical purposes, eliminated." Id. at 9.
317 N.E.2d at 417. An appellate court would still be able to review pure questions of law, but would be
unable to review for any errors which required analysis of the testimony adduced at the original referee's
hearing. See Staggs v. Staggs, 9 Ohio App. 3d 109, 458 N.E.2d 904 11983).
22 f the trial court is to make an independent analysis of the underlying facts involved in the dispute, a
transcript of the testimony elicited before the referee is essential. In re Marriage of Sissinger, 5 Ohio App. 3d
28, 448 N.E.2d 842 (1982).
The trial court, of course, may substitute its judgment as to the findings of fact for that of the referee
either predicated upon the transcript of the proceedings or upon evidence received by the court itself.
Thus it is important that the court be provided a transcript of the evidence where the objections to the
referee's report go to factual issues requiring a de novo review of the evidence by the trial court.
Id. at 30, 448 N.E.2d at 844.
Note, however, that the Ohio case law is not consistent concerning what effect failure to provide a
transcript of the referee's hearing to the trial court has on subsequent appellate review. The better approach.
and one consistent with the Beyer opinion, see supra text accompanying note 124, is that "a judgment upon
the referee's report is fully reviewable upon appeal regardless of whether or not objections were made or sup-
ported in the trial court to the referee's report." Sissinger, 5 Ohio App. 3d at 31, 448 N.E.2d at 842. See also
Zacek v. Zacek, II Ohio App. 3d 91, 463 N.E.2d 391 (1983). Other Ohio appellate courts have declined to
review the findings of the trial court below where the parties had presented the appeals court with a
transcript of the proceedings before the referee, but had not provided the trial court with a copy of that
transcript. See, e.g., Airwyke v. Airwyke, No. 83-1857, slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. filed 1983). ("lIlt is well
settled that a reviewing court can consider only that which was considered by the trial court and nothing
more. Thus, we could not examine a transcript of proceedings which the trial court did not examine or have
the opportunity to examine."); Mc Alister v. McAlister, No. 84-1919 (Ohio Ct. App. Filed 1984, Walker v.
Walker, No. 83-1917 (Ohio Ct. App. Filed 1983).
"
3See. e.g., In re Marriage of Sissinger, 5 Ohio App. 3d 28, 448 N.E.2d 842 (1982). Local Rule 2.51 of the
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, requires that an ob-
jecting party file with the court a transcript of the referee's hearing within thirty days after the filing of ob-
jections.
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party must furnish the trial court with a transcript to enable it to weigh the
contradictory evidence.224 In the absence of such a transcript, the trial court
may accept the findings of the referee without additional consideration.225 The
amendments to Rule 53 specifically adopt this same practice by allowing the
reviewing trial court to adopt the factual findings of the referee in the absence
of the transcript. 26 The responsibility to furnish the transcript is placed square-
ly upon the objecting party and the failure to so provide it can result in the trial
court's outright adoption of the referee's proposed findings of fact without any
consideration. 27 This type of wholesale adoption of the referee's proposed find-
ings results in the entry of judgment by the trial court without "independent"
trial court "decision-making."
Despite its shortcomings, the amended rule provides an improved pro-
cedure which is sure to aid the unwary civil litigant. It specifically provides
that the objecting party may support his or her objection with an "affidavit
about the evidence submitted to the referee" in the absence of the prepared
transcript of the testimony.2 This addition to the rule is a marked improve-
ment upon former practice because it recognizes the practical difficulties faced
by unrepresented and/or indigent litigants whose cases are heard by a referee in
the first instance.229
The unrepresented party who initially appears before the referee rarely
knows to affirmatively request a record of the hearing. Moreover, even an in-
formed party will be unable to understand and appreciate the significance of
the decision to waive a record. The proposed amendment protects the un-
sophisticated party by allowing objections to the factual findings of the referee
in instances where the party presents an affidavit regarding the testimony
presented. A party's right to file objections and receive an "independent"
review by the trial court is at least partly preserved, as is the right to any mean-
ingful appellate review.
While the amended rule provides a needed remedy for the unrepresented
or the impecunious, it is not a panacea. The rule enables a party to present an
2
4See In re Marriage of Sissinger. 5 Ohio App. 3d 28, 448 N.E.2d 842 1982).
221d.
22, The court may adopt any finding of fact in the referee's report without further consideration unless
the party who objects to that finding supports that objection with a copy of all relevant portions of the
transcript from the referee's hearing or the affidavit about evidence submitted to the referees if no
transcript is available.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(6).
22 Id.
2 
2Id.
2'"The new addition to Rule 53 makes trial court review of the referee's report similar to the appellate prac-
tice of review. However, typical appellate review is different from the trial court review process pursuant to
Rule 53 in one significant manner. The appellate court never engages in initial factfinding - it merely deter-
mines if the findings made below are supported by the substantial weight of the evidence. See supra note
175. In marked contrast, the reviewing trial court analyzes and reviews the evidence adduced before the
referee to make its own independent determination of the facts. Seesupra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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affidavit "if no transcript is available.""23 However, the rule offers no definition
of unavailability. Does unavailability refer to the situation where neither party
requests a record of the referee's hearing and subsequently one party files ob-
jections to the report? In the absence of a request for a transcript by one of the
parties, the transcript will certainly not be available to the trial court for its in-
dependent review. Is the transcript unavailable where there is a transcript but
the objecting party is unable to pay for its reproduction? If the purpose of the
addition to the rule is to protect unrepresented or indigent parties, then it
would seem that lack of availability within the meaning of the rule should be
interpreted to mean both literal and economic unavailability. Is the transcript
unavailable when an unsophisticated party waives the right to a transcript by
failing to request one? If so, what constitutes an informed waiver? Absent a
knowing and informed waiver, an unrepresented or indigent party should
benefit from the new procedure whenever that party is unable (economically
or otherwise) to furnish the transcript to the trial court. This broad interpreta-
tion of unavailability would help to protect the litigants and simultaneously
preserve the integrity of the judicial "decision-making" process.
Even should the Ohio courts adopt the approach discussed above,
however, the issue of whether a trial court can adequately review a referee's
proposed findings of fact on the basis of the parties' affidavits must be address-
ed. Normally, a trial court would review the findings of fact based on the
transcript of the testimony elicited before the referee. How does a reviewing
trial judge deal with an objection to the referee's proposed factual findings
when a party's affidavit constitutes the entire "record" of the proceedings
before the referee? Can the trial court independently determine the facts in a
case by reviewing only the affidavit of a party, even if both parties submit af-
fidavits?
To independently assess the validity of the referee's proposed findings, the
court must proceed to weigh the evidence presented to the referee. In theory,
when a counter affidavit is filed, the court can weigh the evidence based upon
the affidavits of both parties. However, given the inherently limited nature of
an affidavit,"' this is a difficult if not impossible task. The dilemma is par-
ticularly acute where the disputed factual questions require findings regarding
the credibility of the testimony given by multiple witnesses.23 The problem is
'MSee OHIO R. CIv. P. 53(E)(6).
"'The transcript of the hearing before the referee provides a verbatim account of the actual testimony ad-
duced including the verbatim account of any cross-examination. An affidavit of the testimony will not be a
verbatim recitation nor will it necessarily provide an account of the cross-examination. In addition, the
natural tendency in drafting an affidavit of this nature is to resort to characterization, thus depriving the
court of a record of the specific testimony elicited through direct and cross-examination.
2
'Judicial factfinding on the basis of a written record is extremely problematic since findings of fact fre-
quently rely on impressions of demeanor and other factors that often are not apparent on the face of a writ-
ten record. See. e.g., Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941). Because an affidavit is not a verbatim record
of the actual evidence adduced at the hearing, it is even less reliable as a basis for factfinding than the
transcript of the hearing.
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equally troublesome in cases where only one party files an affidavit in support
of their objections. In the absence of a counter affidavit, must the trial court
accept the version of the facts as articulated in the sole affidavit? This result
might be acceptable except in those cases where the party failing to file the
counter affidavit is not represented by counsel.
It is difficult if not impossible for a trial court (on the basis of affidavits) to
exercise the independent review and "decision-making" previously discussed.
In order to achieve the degree of independence required by the case law, a trial
court should hear the evidence itself rather than rely on the parties' affidavits
when the trial court is required to resolve questions of disputed fact and no
record of the proceeding before the referee is available. However, to require a
de novo hearing in this instance subverts the overall judicial efficiency of the
reference device. 33
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
Since the increased use of referees began in Ohio approximately ten years
ago,234 the courts have struggled to balance the competing and conflicting inter-
ests that underlie a successful system of reference. First, referee's must be ef-
fective in reducing delays and otherwise increasing the overall efficiency of the
Ohio trial courts.2 35 Secondly, actual judicial authority can only be exercised by
the judiciary and cannot be completely delegated to non-judicial officers.236
The referee-judge relationship as embodied in Rule 53 of the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure, as originally enacted, attempted to balance these interests to
preserve the constitutionality and overall effectiveness of the reference device.
Unfortunately, the effort was not entirely successful.
The "rubber-stamping" problems which developed shortly after the adop-
tion of the original Rule 53237 reflected the need for increased efficiency by a
number of Ohio trial courts. By merely adopting the work of the referee by sig-
nature without independent analysis, many judges relinquished their judicial
"decision-making" authority to their referees.238 In the absence of meaningful
guidance in the original Rule 53, Ohio appellate courts intervened to readjust
the delicate balance which underlies a successful reference system. 39
The developed case law correctly reasserted the primacy of independent
judicial "decision-making." Trial courts were cautioned to exercise their
judicial "decision-making" power independently of their referees."' Despite the
"'See supra note 29.
"See supra note 12.
2
1See supra note 29.
" See supra note 33.
"See supra text beginning at note 70.
"'See supra text beginning at note 70.
2P Id.
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clear functional dichotomy between the referee and judge articulated in the
case law, implementation remained problematic due to the lack of specificity
concerning the proper standard for trial court review of the referee's report and
recommendation(s).2' Rule 53, as amended, attempts to resolve these problems
by specifically addressing various aspects of the judge-referee relationship.
While the amended rule is a clear improvement over its predecessor," 2 it is only
partially successful in eliminating confusion and in balancing the competing
interests which underlie the reference system. Two areas of concern and confu-
sion remain - the proper use of the transcript of the referee's hearing and the
trial court's "scope of review" of the referee's report and recommendation(s).
, There is no doubt that the amended rule improves upon the serious defi-
ciencies of~the original rule with respect to the transcript of the referee's hear-
ing. The amended rule recognizes the important role the transcript plays in
maintaining the functional balance between judge and referee. It also
recognizes the economic realities faced by the average litigant by authorizing
the use of an affidavit in place of the actual transcript of testimony. While this
procedure better protects the rights of individual litigants, a serious question
remains concerning the efficacy of using affidavits in place of a transcript
when the trial court is called upon to determine questions of disputed fact.243 In
this circumstance, the trial court has no choice except to rehear the disputed
evidence itself. This is especially so when factfinding ultimately hinges on
questions of witness credibility. '"
In the review scheme created by Rule 53, as amended, the report of the
referee continues to play a primary role. Thus, the amended rule mandates
that the referee's report contain sufficient findings of fact to allow the trial
court to independently determine the issues and to apply the appropriate rules
of law. However, confusion remains because the phrase "independent analysis
of the issues" contained in the amended Rule 53 is undefined and capable of
more than one meaning in this context.45 Regardless of whether the phrase in-
cludes "issues" of disputed fact, a referee's report should, at a minimum, articu-
late separate findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate a thorough yet
efficient review by the trial court.2" In addition, the report should contain a
241Id.
2'See supra text beginning at note 228.
2'See supra note 23 I.
'"See supra note 232.
"'See supra text beginning at note 165.
'"This recommendation essentially requires that the report of the referee comply with the requirements of
Ohio Civil Rule 52. While findings of fact and conclusions of law are normally the responsibility of the trial
court, "the order of reference to the referee may include instructions to provide the trial judge with recom-
mended separate findings of fact and conclusions of law." Zacek v. Zacek, I I Ohio App. 3d 391, 396, 463
N.E.2d 391, 393 (1983). Requiring separate findings of fact and conclusions of law increases the accuracy
and efficiency of the review process and facilitates the trial court's mandatory review for errors that may ap-
pear on the face of the referee's report. See supra text accompanying note 192. Requiring compliance with
Rule 52 is also consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's test for determining the applicability of the rule
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narrative report of the evidence elicited at the hearing which supports the indi-
vidual findings of fact. Thus, the report would contain on its face not only indi-
vidual findings of fact but a recitation of the evidence to support the
findings.247
The amended rule correctly sets out a clear standard of trial court review
of the legal questions that appear on the face of referee's report and recommen-
dation(s). Prior to adopting the report and recommendation(s) of the referee,
the trial court must review the referee's report for any legal errors that may ap-
pear on the face of the report.24  This is a mandatory review that must take
place even in the absence of objection by either of the litigants.4 9
In marked contrast, the trial court is free to adopt the referee's proposed
findings of fact "without further consideration" unless a party objects to the
referee's report and recommendation(s).25 The amended rule seems to
authorize complete deference to the referee in matters of disputed fact in the
absence of objection, a result that seems to undercut the meaning of "indepen-
dent" trial court "decision-making" in favor of judicial efficiency.25" '
Finally, Rule 53, as amended, completely fails to address one additional
significant issue. How should the reviewing trial court deal with issues of
disputed fact that rest on the determination of credibility? When faced with ob-
jections which challenge the referee's recommended findings of fact, can the
trial court accept or reject the findings of the referee on the basis of credibility
without rehearing the disputed testimony? An affirmative answer raises very
serious due process concerns," 2 while a negative answer significantly under-
itself. The test is whether the proceeding "contemplates an order which is necessarily based upon the deter-
mination of factual issues," and the "questions of fact are tried by the court without intervention of a jury."
Werden v. Crawford, 70 Ohio St. 2d 122, 124, 435 N.E.2d 424, 426 (1982).
2 7A trial court must review the referee's report for errors that appear on the face of the report. The confu-
sion concerning the meaning of the phrase "independent analysis of the issues" contained in the amended
rule, see supra text beginning at note 165, might be resolved by requiring the referee to make separate find-
ings of fact and by requiring a recitation of evidence to support these findings. The trial court would then be
better able to analyze and review both the legal and factual issues. With respect to the factual issues, the trial
court would determine whether the factual findings are supported by the elicited evidence. While this is a
very limited review of the factual issues (with a great deal of deference), it nevertheless requires trial court
'analysis" of factual issues even in the absence of an objection and thus enhances actual trial court
"decision-making." Nevertheless, it still will not fully comport with the notion of true independent judicial
"decision-making."
2
'See OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(5).
2
19/d.
2
501d.
"'See supra text beginning at note 200. This problem is would be partially alleviated if a referee were re-
quired to articulate evidence to support the proposed findings, and if the trial court were to at least apply a
minimal form of review to determine the accuracy of the proposed findings, and if the trial court were to at
least apply a minimal form of review to determine the accuracy of the proposed findings.
2 This article has not addressed the due process issues inherent in the use of referees to determine all the
issues in a case. However, the federal courts have grappled over the years with similar issues in regard to
federal masters and magistrates. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), reh'g denied, 448
U.S. 916 (1981). In Raddatz, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a federal district court was
obligated to conduct a de novo determination when adopting a magistrate's proposed findings of fact when
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mines judicial efficiency. 53 Certainly, the trial court is ill-equipped to make
findings of fact on the basis of affidavits when credibility is an issue.25' Even
when the transcript is available, there may be instances when the trial court
should rehear the evidence to preserve the rights of the parties and the integri-
ty of the judicial process. 5
The clash between judicial efficiency and judicial "decision-making" con-
tinues despite the recent amendments to Rule 53. Though an improvement
over the original Rule 53, the amended rule fails to remedy all the deficiencies
of the referee system and creates additional unresolved problems. It may,
however, be unrealistic to expect more given the conflicting goals of the
reference system. The increased use of referees in the past ten years cor-
responds to a search for procedures to decrease the burden on a besieged
judiciary and simultaneously increase judicial efficiency. The choice has been
to increase the number of full-time referees and to refer to these referees entire
cases for hearing and recommendation(s). In light of anticpated continuing
procedural problems, it may be time to rethink the usefulness of the non-
consensual referral of entire cases to referees for hearing and disposition. This
article does not suggest the elimination of full-time referees. Rather, it recom-
mends that further consideration and thought be given to the manner in which
the referee is utilized. 56
credibility was the major determinant. Over a strong dissent, the Raddatz majority found sufficient pro-
cedural safeguards to minimize any due process problems. Id. at 695. Nonetheless, even the Raddatz majori-
ty seemed to concede that a rejection of a magistrate's proposed findings on the basis of credibility without
rehearing the witnesses was problematic:
The issue is not before us, but we assume it unlikely that a district judge would reject a magistrate's
proposed findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive and substitute the judge's own ap-
praisal; to do so without seeing and hearing the witnesses whose credibility is in question could well
give rise to serious questions which we do not reach.
Id. at 681. Only one Ohio court has addressed this due process issue. In Bakaitis v. Bakaitis, No. 83-7997
(Ohio Ct. App. Filed May 23, 1983), the court rejected the appellant's argument that his due process rights
were violated because the trial court rejected the findings and recommendations of the referee and instead
decided the case on the basis of the transcript of the referee's hearing.
"
3Requiring the trial court to rehear the witnesses results in an overall loss of judicial time. See supra note
28.
'See supra note 23 1.
"See supra note 252.
25 Our current system of non-consensual reference relies on a fiction. If we remain committed to a system of
non-consensual general reference as a mechanism to increase judicial efficiency, rather than perpetuate the
fiction, we should embark on an effort to explore ways to give to referees the authority they currently exer-
cise defacto. In the alternative, increased use of referees in the pre-trial stages of civil litigation could prove
extremely effective while avoiding many of the problems discussed above. See Gallagher, Comment: An Ex-
panding Role for United States Magistrates. 26 Am. U.L. REV. 66, 101 (1976). In 1958, Judge Irving Kauf-
man suggested that federal masters be given an expanded role in pre-trial proceedings. See Kaufman,
Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Cotum. L. REv. 452, 463 $1958). The pre-trial functions which
Judge Kaufman suggested for magistrates in 1958 are essentially those given to magistrates today. See
Gallagher, supra, at 66.
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